CASE COMMENTARIES
BANKRUPTCY
The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth
Circuit extended the Supreme Court’s ruling in Clark v. Rameker,
573 U.S. 122, 134 (2014), and held that in order for 401(k) and IRA
assets to be considered exempt in a bankruptcy proceeding, they
must be created for the retirement of the debtor and the debtor must
contribute funds into the retirement account. Lerbakken v. Sieloff &
Assocs., P. A. (In re Lerbakken), 590 B.R. 895 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2018).
Drew Hove
In In re Lerbakken, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
for the Eighth Circuit addressed whether certain retirement accounts
acquired by property settlement incident to a divorce may be exempt from
creditor claims in a voluntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(d)(12) (2018) offers exemptions for “[r]etirement funds to the extent
that those funds are in a fund or account that is exempt from taxation
under section 401, 403, 408, 408A, 414, 457, or 501(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986.” This provides a safety net to individuals filing
for bankruptcy by allowing them to retain their tax-free retirement
accounts, and directing creditors to collect from the remaining assets.
Following a brief review of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12) and Clark v. Rameker,
573 U.S. 122, 134 (2014), the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
for the Eighth Circuit concluded that retirement funds obtained or
received by means other than self-creation and contribution do not qualify
for this exemption.
In 2014, Brian Lerbakken (“Mr. Lerbakken”) retained Sieloff &
Associates, P.A. (“Sieloff”) to represent him in a divorce proceeding. As
part of the divorce settlement, Mr. Lerbakken was awarded one-half of the
value in his ex-wife's Wells Fargo 401K and an entire IRA account
(“Accounts”). Following the court proceedings, Mr. Lerbakken made no
attempt to obtain title or possession of the accounts. Moreover, Mr.
Lerbakken failed to pay his attorneys’ fees that accrued in the divorce
proceeding. A couple of years later, on January 23, 2018, Mr. Lerbakken
filed a voluntary Chapter 7 petition.
Mr. Lerbakken’s “Schedule C claimed the Accounts [received
pursuant to the divorce settlement] as exempt retirement funds for the
values agreed to under the property settlement.” Mr. Lerbakken argued
1169
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that the Accounts met the statutory definition of a retirement fund,
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12), because their non-taxable status to his
ex-wife inured to his benefit. Sieloff, who was listed as a creditor for
unpaid attorney fees, objected to Mr. Lerbakken’s claim of exemption.
Ultimately, the bankruptcy court rejected Mr. Lerbakken’s claim on the
basis that the Accounts were not retirement funds pursuant to the
definition set forth in Clark. Thus, the Accounts did not qualify for the
exemption. Mr. Lerbakken appealed.
The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth
Circuit ultimately held that the “exemption is limited to individuals who
create and contribute funds into the retirement account.” The court first
noted that the issue of whether the claimed exemption applies presents a
question of law which is subject to de novo review. Rucker v. Belew (In re
Belew), 588 B.R. 875, 876 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2018). The court then began
its analysis by reviewing the language of 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12) to
determine whether a claim of exemption would be proper in this instance.
Specifically, the court recognized that 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(12) contains two
requirements: “(1) that the amount must be retirement funds; and (2) that
the retirement funds must be in an account that is exempt from taxation
under one of the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code set forth
therein. In order for the Account to be exempt both of these elements
must be established.”
After acknowledging and rejecting both Mr. Lerbakken and
Sieloff’s arguments regarding potential tax consequences and penalties, in
addition to ERISA provisions, the court turned to the Supreme Court’s
unanimous decision in Clark. In Clark, the Supreme Court “considered
whether an inherited IRA qualified as a retirement fund for purposes of
exemption under federal law.” The Supreme Court defined the term
“retirement funds” as “sums of money set aside for the day an individual
stops working.” Although the funds in Clark were acquired by a different
method, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth
Circuit viewed the case as determinative, noting that “[t]he opinion clearly
suggests that the exemption is limited to individuals who create and
contribute funds into the retirement account. Retirement funds obtained
or received by any other means do not meet this definition.”
Lastly, the court addressed Lerbakken’s argument that the
Accounts were saved for the joint retirement of him and his ex-wife. The
court responded by explaining that “[c]ourts are not required to address
these subjective, [fact-intensive] considerations in determining the
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exemption issue.” Rather, the court is to ask “whether, as an objective
matter, the account is one set aside for the day when an individual stops
working.” (quoting Clark). Notwithstanding the fact that the case arose
in a different context, the court relied on Clark in determining that
retirement accounts acquired by way of property settlement are not
retirement funds which qualify as exempt under federal bankruptcy law.
Ultimately, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s holding that the
bankruptcy exemption for retirement funds does not extend to accounts
received in the name of another party. The court explained that retirement
funds obtained or received by any other means, including, but not limited
to, property settlements, do not meet the Clark definition of “retirement
funds.” Therefore, they are not exempt from the claims of creditors.
In light of this decision, practitioners should be cognizant of their client’s
financial condition and likelihood of filing for bankruptcy. The court does
not directly address whether or not Mr. Lerbakken could have shielded
the retirement funds from the creditors. As such, practitioners should
advise their clients not to comingle retirement funds awarded in a divorce
settlement with their own personal retirement accounts. Such actions
could potentially expose a client’s retirement funds, which would
otherwise be exempt from bankruptcy proceedings, to creditors in the
event of a bankruptcy.
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff
shareholder may pierce the corporate veil of her own corporation in
order to hold the other shareholder personally liable for a judgment
she obtained against the corporation when the other shareholder
disregards the corporate structure to his benefit and the plaintiff
shareholder’s detriment. Judd v. Guye, No. M2017-01791-COA-R3-CV,
2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 400, 2018 WL 3460435 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 17,
2018).
Tyler Munger
In Judd v. Guye, the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed whether
a plaintiff shareholder may pierce the corporate veil of her own
corporation to hold the other shareholder personally liable for the unpaid
judgment she obtained against the corporation, despite both parties being
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equal shareholders in the corporation. Prior to the case, Tennessee courts
had not yet addressed whether the state recognized an insider reverse
piercing of the corporate veil as an equitable remedy. However, upon
review, the Tennessee Court of Appeals found that the trial court’s action
in the present case did not constitute an insider reverse piercing and held
that, where a defendant disregards the corporation’s structure to his
benefit and the plaintiff’s detriment, the plaintiff may pierce the corporate
veil in order to recover an award for a previous judgment rendered against
her own corporation.
This is the second action that arose from a financial dispute
between two siblings: Carlene Guye Judd (“Carlene”) and her brother,
Carlton Guye (“Carlton”), who were equal shareholders in the West Mead
Decorating Company, Inc. (“WMDC” or the “Company”). During the
economic recession beginning in 2007-2008, WMDC’s business
experienced a dramatic drop in profits. Around the same time, Carlene
noticed that Carlton was using the company’s financial resources for his
own benefit, including: living rent-free in an apartment on real estate
owned by WMDC, and using WMDC funds to pay for his utilities, car
insurance on four personal vehicles, personal cell phone bills, groceries,
and personal vacations and related expenses. Additionally,, Carlton had
sold company property—one tractor—in order to pay off the outstanding
obligation of a personal promissory note, among other things.
To protect the company’s assets, Carlene requested that Carlton
stop using WMDC’s credit cards, as well as provide her with invoices for
the work he had done for customers and any payments received from the
customers to deposit in WMDC’s account. When Carlton ignored these
requests, Carlene removed Carlton’s privileges from the company credit
cards, changed the company’s P.O. Box, and opened new bank accounts
on behalf of WMDC. Carlton, in response, opened two new credit cards
on behalf of WMDC, deposited checks from previous customers into a
new bank account, locked Carlene out of the WMDC building, stopped
paying her salary, and completely took control of the Company. Carlton
also refused to turn over any of the requested payments or information
regarding WMDC’s finances to Carlene.
In February 2013, Carlene brought her first action against WMDC
and Carlton, in her individual capacity, as well as derivatively as a WMDC
shareholder. Carlene requested that the court dissolve WMDC, appoint a
receiver to wind up the company, and allow the her to recover
misappropriated funds and converted property of WMDC from Carlton.
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Following a trial, the court ruled, inter alia, that Carlton abused the
corporate structure of WMDC for his own benefit, and had acted to the
detriment of WMDC and Carlene. The court awarded Carlene $266,
246.70 in her individual capacity against WMDC and $239, 102.79 in her
derivative capacity, for the benefit of WMDC, against Carlton.
Carlton fully satisfied the judgment against him to WMDC.
However, WMDC was unable to fully satisfy the judgment owed to
Carlene, leaving an outstanding balance of $161,147.56. As a result,
Carlene bought this action seeking to pierce the corporate veil of WMDC
and hold Carlton liable for the remaining balance owed by WMDC. At
trial, Carlene moved for summary judgment, relying heavily on findings
from the previous action. Carlton opposed the motion, arguing that
Carlene was requesting a “reverse piercing” of the corporate veil (i.e.
“when a creditor seeks to hold the corporation accountable for the actions
of its shareholders.”), a remedy Tennessee courts have not recognized.
In deciding this issue of first impression, the trial court considered
two cases from other jurisdictions: Hibbs v. Berger, 430 S.W.3d 296, 309
(Miss. Ct. App. 2014) and Walensky v. Jonathan Royce Int’l Inc., 624 A.2d 613
(N.J. Super. 1993). In Hibbs, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that,
under appropriate circumstances, minority shareholders may attempt to
pierce the corporate veil in order to hold a majority shareholder liable.
“After all, if majority shareholders desire to be protected via the equitable
doctrine of corporate veil piercing, then we should also require majority
shareholders to operate under the same equitable principles by which they
seek protection.” Hibbs, 430 S.W.3d at 309. In Walensky, a case where
minority shareholders in a closely held corporation were defrauded by a
majority stockholder’s disregard of the corporate structure, the New Jersey
Superior Court held that a controlling stockholder can be liable for debts
of a corporation where he misuses the corporation’s funds for personal
expenses.
Acknowledging that those cases differ from the present case,
where two shareholders own equal shares in the company, the trial court
held that the same logic nonetheless applies in a situation where a
dominant shareholder acts in a way that harms another shareholder. Thus,
“the Chancellor found that the claim at issue was not one of reverse veil
piercing, but instead it was more akin to when one shareholder, who is a
creditor of the corporation, is seeking to hold another shareholder liable
by piercing the corporate veil.” The Chancellor also held that a
shareholder may pierce the corporate veil of a company and hold a
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defendant shareholder liable when (1) the plaintiff shareholder has an
unfulfilled judgment against the company and (2) the defendant
shareholder acted in a controlling capacity of the company to the
detriment of the company and its shareholders. Accordingly, the
Chancellor granted summary judgment to Carlene and Carlton appealed.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s grant of summary judgment for Carlene, allowing her to pierce
WMDC’s corporate veil and hold Carlton personally liable for the
judgments against WMDC. However, the court stated that the decision
to pierce the corporate veil of a company is a fact-based determination,
under which courts must consider a variety of factors, and that courts
should presumptively treat a corporation as a separate entity from its
shareholders. Regardless, given the record from the previous action, the
court determined that the trial court’s decision to grant summary judgment
to the plaintiff, allowing Carlene to pierce the corporate veil, was an
appropriate one.
To ensure that a client is aware of the potential personal liability
that may attach to majority shareholders of a corporation from a judgment
against the corporation, practitioners should notify clients that a majority
shareholder’s disregard of the corporate formalities may allow a piercing
of the corporate veil in a way that holds an individual majority shareholder
personally liable. Furthermore, practitioners should advise clients that this
holding allows a piercing of the corporate veil where two individuals are
equal shareholders of a corporation. However, from the holding in this
case, it remains unclear how frequently Tennessee courts will utilize this
remedy, given that the facts of the case represent a clear and blatant
example of abuse of the corporate structure by the defendant.
CONTRACTS
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the simple inclusion of
the word “individually” cannot, by itself, designate personal liability
upon the signatories of a lease when the body of the agreement is
silent as to any assumption of personal liability. Teal Properties v. Dog
House Investments, LLC, No. M2018-00257-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL
3912299, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 470, 2018 WL 3912299 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Aug. 15, 2018).
Wade Blair
In Teal Properties v. Dog House Investments, LLC, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals addressed whether co-owners of a limited liability
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company became personally liable for the obligations of the entity when
they signed a lease agreement twice: once on behalf of the entity in a
representative capacity, and once more on a line followed by the word
“individually”, when the LLC was the sole party to the lease agreement
and the lease was otherwise devoid of any provision or language conveying
personal liability to the co-owners.
Teal Properties, Inc. (“Teal”), owner of office and warehouse
space in Nashville, Tennessee, and Dog House Investments, LLC (“Dog
House”), owned jointly by Steve Lassiter and Nancy Purvis (collectively,
“Lassiter and Purvis”), entered into a commercial lease agreement (the
“Lease”). The Lease provided that Teal would lease one of its properties
to Dog House for a four-year term beginning on June 1, 2009 and ending
on May 31, 2013, with two additional five-year option periods after the
expiration of the original lease term. Teal and Dog House were the only
named parties to the Lease, and all obligations set forth in the Lease were
imposed upon Teal and Dog House. Furthermore, there was no language
in the Lease that indicated that Lassiter and Purvis were personally liable
for any obligation under the Lease. However, the Lease contained two
signature lines. The first line was preceded by the word “By” and followed
by Lassiter and Purvis’s signatures. Underneath that line, both Lassiter
and Purvis handwrote the word “co-owner” next to the word “Title”.
These two lines combined show Lassiter and Purvis signing in their
representative capacity on behalf of Dog House as joint co-owners. The
second line contained both Lassiter and Purvis’s full names, but was
followed by the word “Individually”. Lassiter and Purvis both signed.
In October of 2017, during the first option period, Teal filed suit
for breach of contract against Dog House and Lassiter and Purvis for
failure to perform obligations under the Lease. Lassiter and Purvis
responded by filing an answer in which they denied all of Teal’s breach of
contract claims. They also jointly filed a motion to dismiss all claims
against them individually, as they were not named parties to the Lease.
They argued that since Dog House was the only party to the lease, Dog
House was the only party bound to its provisions. In its response, Teal
relied on the second signature line, which appeared above the word
“Individually”, to argue that when Lassiter and Purvis signed their names
on those lines it bound them in their individual capacities in addition to
their representative capacities as co-owners of Dog House.
The trial court dismissed all claims against Lassiter and Purvis
individually. Specifically, the trial court held that the Lease “while signed
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by both Lassiter and Purvis, does not provide for any liability of Lassiter
or Purvis, whether individually or as a guarantor…” Additionally, the
court did not attach personal liability to Lassiter and Purvis because the
lessee to the Lease was Dog House and not Lassiter and Purvis, making
Dog House the only party bound to its terms.
Teal appealed, maintaining that by signing the lease twice Lassiter
and Purvis bound themselves individually. Teal argued that the trial court
incorrectly interpreted the Tennessee Supreme Court’s decisions in 84
Lumber Co. v. Smith, 356 S.W.3d 380 (Tenn. 2011) and MLG Enters. LLC
v. Johnson, 507 S.W.3d 183 (Tenn. 2016). In 84 Lumber, the Tennessee
Supreme Court held that “[a] representative who signs a contract may be
personally bound…when the clear intent of the contract is to bind the
representative.” 356 S.W.3d at 382–383. Utilizing this language, Teal
argued that the second signature line, in the Lease, that was followed by
the word “Individually” demonstrated “clear and unambiguous” language
to bind Lassiter and Purvis in both a representative capacity and as
personal guarantors.
In MLG Enterprises, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that an
initial signature made in a representative capacity on behalf of an entity
does not indicate that the second signature line should be disregarded as a
nullity for purposes of personal liability. Teal used this language to argue
in its brief that the Supreme Court held “that a second signature on a lease
agreement was sufficient to bind one individually as a guarantor of the
tenant’s obligation under the lease.” The Tennessee Court of Appeals
notes, however, that Teal is imprecise in its analysis of the court’s prior
holdings.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals points out a crucial distinction
between the Lease and the contracts in 84 Lumber and MLG Enterprises. In
both 84 Lumber and MLG Enterprises, the relevant contracts contained
separate provisions with “explicit and unambiguous language stating that
the signatories were personally assuming the liabilities of their respective
entities. Here, there is no [such] language…” As a result, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals clarified the law by stating that a second signature, alone,
is not enough to personally bind a signatory. It is the combined effect of
the second signature with the explicit and unambiguous additional
language in separate provisions of the document that convey personal
liability upon a signatory.
Accordingly, the court held that “the formal inclusion of the single
word ‘individually’ cannot by itself convey personal liability upon [Lassiter
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and Purvis] when the body of the lease is otherwise devoid of any
assumption of personal obligation or guarantor status.” Thus, Dog House
is the only party liable in the Lease.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals noted that the holding here is
consistent with its earlier decision in Brooks v. Networks of Chattanooga, 946
S.W.2d 321 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). There, inclusion of the word
“individually” after a signature was deemed insufficient to establish
personal liability of the signatory, because the lease did not explicitly
indicate that the parties intended to be personally bound.
This decision clarifies the analytical framework Tennessee courts
apply to contract disputes. In particular, the holding gives clear guidance
that the intent of the parties and the entire body of the contract are more
important than words such as “individually”, which are arbitrary in relation
to what was bargained for. Transactional attorneys should be cognizant
of the fact that in the contract drafting stage, if personal liability is to be
enforced, it must be negotiated, drafted, and have a strong visual presence
within the contract terms. This way, the contract can properly distinguish
between the corporate entity and the individual signatory regarding
responsibilities in the event of breach. Taking the proper steps in the
drafting stage of the contract will help clients avoid costly disputes if a
breach occurs.
CORPORATE FINANCE
The Chancery Court for the State of Tennessee, on remand from the
Tennessee Supreme Court, reconsidered the fair valuation
determination of dissenting shareholder’s shares following the
Supreme Court’s adoption of the Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983) valuation approach as opposed to the Blasingame v.
American Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659 (Ten. 1983) by evaluating
the findings and opinion of each party’s expert. Athlon Sports
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Duggan, No. 12-187-III (Tenn. Ch. Nov. 9, 2018).
Andrew Cox
In Athlon Sports Commc’ns, Inc. v. Duggan, the Chancery Court for
the State of Tennessee, on remand from the Tennessee Supreme Court,
reconsidered its fair value determination of dissenting shareholders’ shares
following the Supreme Court’s adoption of the Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457
A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) valuation approach, an approach that allows courts
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to use “any technique or method generally acceptable in the financial
community and admissible in court.”
Athlon Sports Communications, Inc. was founded in 1967, as “a
Nashville-based media business engaged in publishing and sports
marketing” (the “Company”). The Company maintained steady sales until
2008, when profits began to decline. By 2009, the Company’s profits had
declined by 35%. In 2010, the Company hired Stephen Duggan
(“Duggan”) in hopes that he would turn the tide for the flagging company.
Duggan, “a sophisticated, experienced and knowledgeable investor and
analyst of companies and their operations and finances[,]” convinced the
Company that he would save them via a new stream of advertising
revenue: a monthly sports magazine inserted into local newspapers.
“At a March 12, 2010 meeting of the Company’s Board,
Defendant Duggan presented two cases for his initiative: a base case and
a worse case.” Following that, Duggan was named president of the
Company’s newspaper magazine division and given a voting seat on the
Company’s board after purchasing 15% of Series A Preferred Company
stock. Ultimately, however, the promised revenue never materialized and
the Company lost $9.5 million between 2010 and 2012: “losses
significantly greater than the worse case presented by Defendant Duggan.”
In 2011, the company had a dismissal year. Apart from Duggan,
all Board of Director employees took permanent salary cuts. The
Company was also forced to sell its building and Keyman insurance for
Spencer Hays. “In November 2011, Defendant Duggan was terminated as
President of the Newspaper Magazine Division of the Company.”
Additionally, the Company’s request for a line of credit was rejected by
the bank. The Company was on the verge of insolvency, and it became
clear that a change was needed.
After firing Dugan, the Company considered several solutions.
They consulted a bankruptcy attorney. They looked for, but could not
locate, third party investment. Finally, in the spring of 2012, the Company
devised a plan of merger. After negotiations, in March 2012, the Company
approved Mr. Hays proposition that “he and his co-investors would
provide 2 million of additional capital to the Company with a Plan of
Merger and proposed payment of $.10 per share.” It is this plan to which
the Defendants dissented.
In Tennessee, the procedure for shareholders to dissent from a
share value dictated by a plan of merger is outlined in Tennessee Code
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Annotated sections 48-21-101 through 302. Specifically, when the parties
cannot agree, such as the parties in this case, Tennessee Code Annotated
sections 48-28-301 through 303 provide the parties with a judicial
proceeding to “determine the fair value of the dissenter’s shares.” As the
parties were unable to agree within 2 months of receiving demand for
payment on the fair value of the shares, the Company filed suit. A trial
was held in September 2015 where parties provided exhibits and expert
opinions in support of their valuations. The Company’s expert asserted
that the value of the shares was zero. Defendants’ expert claimed,
however, that each share was worth $6.40.
Tennessee valuation law, with respect to determining fair value, is
a hybrid of statute and case law. Tennessee Code Annotated section 4821-101(4) says that the fair value of the shares must be based on the value
of the shares “immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action
to which the dissenter objects, excluding any appreciation or depreciation
in anticipation of the corporate action . . . .” In October 2015, following
Tennessee valuation law, the trial court valued the shares at no more than
$0.10 per share. Defendants appealed and the Tennessee Supreme Court
granted review.
Upon review, the Supreme Court overruled its previous holding
in Blasingame v. Am. Materials, Inc., 654 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tenn. 1983), to
the extent that it prevented trial courts from using valuation methods
other than the Delaware Block Method. Instead, the Court adopted the
approach presented in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 712-13 (Del.
1983), which provides that “any technique or method generally acceptable
in the financial community and admissible in court” can be used to value
the stock. Because the Court was unable to determine to what extent the
trial court had relied solely on the Delaware Block Method, the Court
vacated the judgement and remanded the case to the trial court for an
opinion consistent with its updated jurisprudence.
On remand, Defendant’s argued that the Delaware Block method
was a particularly poor method for valuation, as the Company had
“recently implemented [a] transformative business plan.” Instead of
relying on a backwards looking valuation, like the Delaware Block Method,
Defendants petitioned the court to use the discounted-cash-flow (“DCF”)
method, “which focuses on the company’s projected cash flows.”
Using the newly adopted Weinberger standard, the court
reexamined the complete record, paying particular attention to each
party’s expert. Looking at the record for a second time, the court sided
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with the Company’s expert’s opinion, with one exception—share value.
Instead of finding a $NIL value for the shares, like the Company’s expert,
the court valued the shares at $0.10 per share. The court based its
valuation on “the recognition of the Athlon name or brand and the $9
million in circulation. . . .” The court then turned to Defendants’ expert.
Unfortunately for Defendants, the court denied their request to
apply the DCF method and summarily rejected Defendants’ expert’s
opinion. While the court recognized that it had the power to use the DCF
method of valuation in some cases, it concluded that the bases used by
Defendants’ expert was “the product of speculation and d[id] not provide
a reliable basis for valuation.” The court paid particular attention to
Defendants’ use of a Confidential Information Memorandum (“CIM”)
and Defendants’ expert’s lack of supported evidence.
One of the primary bases used by Defendants in applying the DCF
method was a confidential information memorandum (“CIM”). The CIM,
composed by Defendant Duggan, was used to entice potential investors
once Defendant Duggan’s new project proved it would not bear any fruit.
The court declined to use the CIM as it contained “projections [that] were
not used to manage the business.” The court found that the CIM was
“aspirational” and written “to attract the attention of potential investors.”
Furthermore, the court agreed with the Company’s CFO’s testimony that
the CIM was speculative and unreliable.
Additionally, the court declined to use Defendants’ DCF method
based on the testimony of their expert. The court found the expert failed
to make comparisons and analyze projections against actual performance
with information actually provided in discovery. Moreover, the expert
failed to consider company specific risk factors and used a long-term
growth rate twice that of the growth rate for the print media industry.
In light of the court’s decision, transactional attorneys should be
aware that they are no longer limited to the Delaware Block Method of
evaluation when determining share value in dissenter’s rights cases. It is
important, however, that to the extent a company uses a forward-looking
method, the company must refrain from including speculative measures.
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EMPLOYMENT
The Tennessee Court of Appeals held that an employee is
not prohibited, per se, from preparing to compete with his current
employer absent any intentional sabotage by the employee, or any
agreements that barred such actions. Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc. v. Blue Wave
Pool Supply of Memphis, LLC, No. W2017-01894-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL
3738666, 2018 Tenn. App. LEXIS 448 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2018).
Jordan Ferrell
In Leslie’s Poolmart, Inc. v. Blue Wave Pool Supply of Memphis, LLC, the
Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed whether the trial court erred in
holding that the defendants did not breach their employment agreement,
maliciously or illegally misappropriate the plaintiff’s trade secrets, or
induce the plaintiff to suffer damages due to the defendants’ conduct. The
court also addressed whether the defendants were entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees, under T.C.A. § 47-25-1705, due to the plaintiff’s alleged
bad faith claim of misappropriation of trade secrets.
This case arose after Todd Heins (“Heins”), manager of Leslie’s
Poolmart, Inc.’s (“Leslie’s”) Bartlett Hills location in Memphis, created a
pool supply business, Blue Wave Pool Supply (“Blue Wave”), that would
become a de facto competitor to Leslie’s. Heins’ decision to create his
own store stemmed from a conversation he had with Jay Karcher
(“Karcher”) in April 2015. The Court discussed the circumstances of how
Heins and Karcher agreed (while Heins was still an employee) to form a
new business in competition with Leslie’s post-employment; exactly when
Heins offered Karcher a job; how and why Heins was in possession of
Leslie’s proprietary information, such as Blue Wave’s selection of its
physical premises, Leslie’s 2015 Productivity Book, and numerous shop
tags containing customer information, and what Heins did with that
intellectual properties.
While under Leslie’s employment, Karcher
entered Leslie’s as a customer, and he and Heins engaged in a spontaneous
conversation regarding the possibility of going into business together.
That day’s conversation was abstract but led to future communications
that ultimately resulted in the formation and opening of Blue Wave in
2016, following Heins’ resignation from Leslie’s.
While under Leslie’s employment, Heins was ordered by a superior
to take possession of the company’s 2015 Productivity Book, which
contained supply and demand statistics, and through forgetfulness, Heins
maintained possession of the book until the eve of trial. Upon his
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departure from Leslie’s, Heins also took possession of several shop tags,
which contained personal contact information of Leslie’s customers.
Additionally, Heins’ former Leslie’s colleague, Chad Pitcock (“Pitcock”),
left Leslie’s to join Heins at Blue Wave. Shortly after Blue Wave officially
opened for business, “ Leslie's sued Blue Wave, Heins, Karcher, and
Pitcock, seeking damages and injunctive relief, asserting among other
things breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, misappropriation of
trade secrets, and inducement to breach contract.”
The Chancery Court for Shelby County, Tennessee, dismissed all
of Leslie’s claims with prejudice based on its determination that the
defendants’ actions were all proper and lawful, except Heins’ taking
possession of the shop tags. Despite the court finding this specific deed
actionable, the court held that no damages resulted, so the claim was
similarly rejected. Additionally, the court noted that the actions taken by
Heins and Karcher were all based on their desire to own their own
business and not intended to cause harm to Leslie’s. Leslie’s appealed.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
courts findings that the defendants were blameless in all of their actions,
except taking possession of the shop tags, and that even those illconsidered actions failed to result in damages to Leslie’s. Thus, the trial
court was correct in dismissing all claims with prejudice. The court also
ruled that the defendant’s counter-claim for attorney fees to penalize the
plaintiff for an alleged misappropriation claim in bad faith was groundless.
First, the court addressed whether the trial court erred in finding
that Heins and Pitcock breached their employment agreement. Both
Heins and Pitcock executed a non-competition and non-solicitation
agreement while employed at Leslie’s. The non-compete provision
provided, in part, that neither employee would compete with Leslie’s while
they were still employed, without written consent from Leslie’s. The
appellate court relied heavily on its previous decision in Dominion
Enterprises v. Dataium, No. M2012-02385-COA-R3-CV, 2013 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 840, 2013 WL 6858266, (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 27, 2013) in deciding
whether Heins and Pitcock bread their fiduciary duty to Leslie’s. The
court noted that “relevant case law reflects that an employee is not
prohibited, per se, from preparing to compete post-employment.
Competition is, obviously, a key element of the free enterprise system.”
Additionally, the court recognized that the non-compete agreements at
issue did not directly provide that an individual could not compete postemployment.
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Leslie’s also claimed that Heins wrongfully enticed Pitcock to
resign from his position at Leslies and also breached his employment
agreement by creating a company that directly competes with Leslie’s. The
court reiterates once more that the mere act of planning a future economic
venture, or preparing to compete, only serves to foster the prevailing
society’s interest in protecting the freedoms of employment and
competition. Additionally, the underlying facts provide that Heins in no
way intended to undermine Leslie’s. The court points to the fact that the
initial conversation with Karcher was a completely spontaneous exchange
and that Karcher initiated the topic, that Heins undertook no action that
directly competed with Leslie’s until post-resignation, and that Heins did
not improperly solicit Pitcock away from Leslie’s. The only improper
action was Heins’ taking of the shop tags, but the Court found that the
Leslie’s suffered no harm.
Regarding the alleged misappropriation of Leslie’s trade secrets,
the Court acknowledged the standard for the trial court’s finding on
testimony credibility was clear and convincing evidence; as opposed to
ruling of law that are reviewed with no such evidence. The Court was
forced to yield to the trial court’s determination that Heins did not
misappropriate any of the plaintiff’s trade secrets without clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. As such, the trial court determined
that the defendants’ testimony regarding the site selection for the Blue
Wave store and the possession of the 2015 Productivity Book was more
logical than the plaintiff’s testimony, therefore, this Court upheld those
findings of fact.
Third, the court addressed the trial court’s finding that Leslie’s
suffered no damages due to the defendants’ alleged behavior. The Court
previously addressed that Heins’ inappropriate possession of the shop tags
resulted in zero damages. In addition, the court concluded that neither
defendant breached any contractual/fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, and
that any negative change in the plaintiff’s revenue, due to the existence of
the new Blue Wave store, resulted from normal competition and does not
serve as a justifiable basis for awarding of damages.
Finally, the Court attended to the defendants’ counter-claim that
they were entitled to an award of attorney’s fees based on the plaintiff’s
alleged bad faith claim of trade secret misappropriation. The court quickly
dismissed this claim because Heins was not completely innocent in his
taking of the shop tags. This act was determined to be misappropriation,
however, no damages resulted; so an allegation of a bad faith claim failed.
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As such, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that the defendants
did not breach any employment agreement or fiduciary duty to their
employers, that employees can prepare to compete while still employed,
and that none of the defendants’ actions resulted in any substantive
damages.
In light of this decision, transactional attorneys in Tennessee
representing employers should advise their clients to be more specific in
drafting employment agreements. Attorneys should also advise employers
to keep information they desire to remain confidential under closer
supervision and to be wary of leaving important company documents with
employees. Leslie’s Poolmart v. Blue Wave illuminates how courts favor
employees’ rights to freedom of competition in these claims, while still
ensuring that individuals are not in breach of contractual or fiduciary
duties. As such, attorneys representing employees should advise their
clients on how to toe the line of preparing to compete while not crossing
over into true competition.
TAX
The United States Supreme Court overturned both its decisions in
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) and National Bellas
Hess, Inc. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967) and held a
state may collect sales tax from remote-sellers, regardless of whether
the sellers have a physical presence within a state. South Dakota v.
Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
Andrew Harrison
In South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., the United States Supreme Court
overruled its holdings in National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 386
U.S. 753 (1967) and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)
(hereinafter collectively referred to as “Quill and Bellas Hess”) and resolved
the fifty-year-old dormant Commerce Clause issue which allowed remotesellers without a physical presence within a state to avoid use tax
collection.
The case at bar arose when South Dakota enacted S.B. 106, which
“provide[d] for the collection of sales taxes from certain remote sellers”—
sellers who “deliver[ed] more than $100,000 of goods or services into the
State or engage[ed] in 200 or more separate transactions for the delivery
of goods or services into the State” on an annual basis (hereinafter referred
to as the “Act”), in order to “confront the serious inequality Quill
imposes.” S.B. 106, 91st Leg. (S.D. 2006).
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The controversial holdings in both Quill and Bellas Hess provided
that remote-sellers—those sellers who lack a physical presence in a state—
may not be required to collect sales tax. Instead, the burden to report the
tax was placed squarely on individual South Dakota citizens when they
purchased goods and services from out-of-state sellers.
Unsurprisingly, the impracticality of collection and
noncompliance from citizens led to a substantial reduction in state use tax
collection. South Dakota, as a result of Quill and Bella Hess, lost between
$48 and $58 million annually due to no state income tax and the substantial
reliance on sales and use taxes to fund state expenditures.
“The legislature found that the inability to collect sales tax from
remote sellers was ‘seriously eroding the sales tax base’ and ‘causing
revenue losses and imminent harm . . . through the loss of critical funding
for state and local services” and provided an unfair advantage to remotesellers in contrast to in-state brick-and-mortar sellers. In response, South
Dakota issued a state of emergency and enacted the Act in an attempt to
require out-of-state sellers to collect and remit sales tax on items sold
within the state—in direct opposition to the holdings in Quill and Bellas
Hess.
In a concerted effort to enforce the Act, South Dakota filed a
declaratory judgment against three online retailers: Wayfair, Inc.,
Overstock.com, Inc., and Newegg (hereinafter collectively referred to as
the “Retailers”), who regularly shipped goods into South Dakota, did not
have a physical presence or collect sales tax there, and certainly met the
minimum requirements of the Act.
The Retailers moved for summary judgment and argued that the
Act was unconstitutional under Quill and Bellas Hess. “South Dakota
conceded that the Act [could not] survive under Bellas Hess and Quill but
asserted the importance, indeed the necessity, of . . . review[ing] those
earlier decisions in light of current economic realities.” Ultimately, “the
trial court granted summary judgment ” in favor of the Retailers.
South Dakota appealed to the South Dakota Supreme Court, who
affirmed, and held that Act invalid because Quill and Bellas Hess were
indeed the controlling precedents on Commerce Clause issues relating to
the collection of sale and use taxes from remote-sellers. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Justice Kennedy delivered the 5-4 majority decision of the Court
which overruled the physical presence rule in Quill and Bellas Hess. In the
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decision, Justice Kennedy outlined the historical development of the
Commerce Clause through a review of its application in prior cases and
determined that the physical presence rule had been repeatedly criticized
and challenged. The Court elucidated that “[e]ach year, the physical
presence rule becomes further removed from economic reality and results
in significant revenue losses to the [s]tates.” Therefore, the decisions in
Quill and Bellas Hess should be overruled due to the emergence and
prominence of high-volume online retail which has “create[ed] an
inefficient ‘online sales tax loophole’ that gives out-of-state businesses an
advantage” and has created an ever-inflating tax revenue loss for state
governments.
The Court further examined additional flaws in Quill and Bellas
Hess’s holdings. First, the Court identified that the Due Process and
Commerce Clause standards are similar insofar as they require “some
definite link, some minimum connection between a state and a person,
property or transaction it seeks to tax.” The physical presence rule is not
a “necessary interpretation” of this requirement. Additionally, the physical
presence rule creates market distortions and imposes an “arbitrary [and]
formalistic distinction that the Court’s modern Commerce Clause
precedents disavow.”
Citing McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 50,
n.9 (1940), the Court found that “[t]he imposition on the seller of the duty
to ensure collection of the tax from the purchaser does not violate the
[C]ommerce [C]lause.” When viewed in conjunction with Quill and Bellas
Hess, the Court determined the physical presence rule to be an outmoded
version of a retailer’s “substantial nexus” and is an unnecessary
requirement when the Commerce Clause is interpreted.
In addition, Quill and Bellas Hess placed in-state retailers at a
competitive disadvantage through the required collection of sales and use
taxes. This allowed out-of-state sellers to avoid and even advertise the
non-collection of tax which created a substantial market distortion. The
consequence of this was a non-uniform “judicially created tax shelter for
[out-of-state] businesses.” Because of this market distortion, the Court
found it necessary to “reject the physical presence rule.”
Last, the Court found the arbitrary and formalistic distinction
“artificial in its entirety” and determined it violated the Commerce Clause
through the “intru[sion] on [s]tates’ reasonable choices in enacting their
tax systems.” In effect, an upholding of the physical presence tradition—
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substantial nexus—encourages tax evasion and harms both “federalism
and free markets.”
The Court vacated the Supreme Court of South Dakota’s
judgment, “remanded for further proceedings,” and recognized that stare
decisis was no longer appropriate where the rapid expansion of Internet
sales, the increase in “revenue shortfall faced by [s]tates seeking to collect
their sales and use taxes,” and the failure of consumers “to comply with
lawful use taxes” has made the physical presence rule impractical.
Justice Thomas, in a concurrence, stated he should have joined
Justice White’s dissent in Quill and agreed that Quill and Bellas Hess “can
no longer be rationally justified” due to the nature of modern commerce.
In a second concurrence, Justice Gorsuch criticized the dormant
Commerce Clause—prohibiting state legislation that discriminates against
interstate commerce—due to the tax avoidance available under Quill and
Bellas Hess. Further, Justice Gorsuch argued Quill and Bella Hess
discriminates against brick-and-mortar retailers and unfairly created a tax
break for out-of-state sellers.
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, filed a dissent—affirmatively recognizing the tax collection issue
created by Quill and Bellas Hess—that emphasized the necessity of stare
decisis for the issue at bar. Chief Justice Roberts recognized that “the
[I]nternet’s prevalence and power have changed the dynamics of the
national economy,” but opined that it is not the Court’s place to discard
of the physical presence rule when “any alteration to those rules [may
have] the potential to disrupt such a critical segment of the economy . . .
.” Instead, the Wayfair decision is one that should be undertaken solely by
Congress.
In response to the Wayfair decision, practitioners should advise a
retail client who acts as a remote-seller that the client is likely to be subject
to the burden of sales tax collection, even when a physical presence is not
apparent. However, this does not apply to all remote-sellers, as some
states have adopted statutes that protect small businesses from the tax
collection burden. South Dakota’s Act, for example, “applies only to
sellers that, on an annual basis, deliver more than $100,000 of goods or
services into the [s]tate or engage in 200 or more separate transactions for
the delivery of goods or services into the [s]tate.”
Similarly, the Tennessee Department of Revenue issued Rule
1320-05-01-.129(2) in 2016 which provides a safe harbor for remote-
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sellers who deliver less than $500,000 of goods or services into the state
and provides no separate transactions threshold. See TENN. COMP. R. &
REGS. § 1320-05-01-.129(2). (2016). Although this is similar to the South
Dakota Act and may be deemed constitutional if litigated, practitioners
should warn their clients that potential litigation issues may arise if they
elect to avoid use tax collection. Furthermore, practitioners should advise
smaller clients, who do not currently have an out-of-state tax collection
system implemented, to use an existing e-commerce platform, find an
existing tax-collection software system, or reduce their sales in that specific
state.

